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ABSTRACT 
Effective legislation and standards for the coordination 
procedures between consumers, producers and the system 
operator supports the advances in the technologies that 
lead to smart distribution systems. In short-term (ST) 
maintenance scheduling procedure, the energy producers 
in a distribution system access to the long-term (LT) 
outage plan that is released by the distribution system 
operator (DSO). The impact of this additional information 
on the decision-making procedure of producers in ST 
maintenance scheduling is studied in this paper. The final 
ST maintenance plan requires the approval of the DSO 
that has the responsibility to secure the network reliability 
and quality, and other players have to follow the finalized 
schedule. Maintenance scheduling in the producers’ layer 
and the coordination procedure between them and the 
DSO is modelled in this paper. The proposed method is 
applied to a 33-bus distribution system. 
INTRODUCTION 
LT generation maintenance plans for the time horizon of a 
year or more are developed through an iterative 
coordination procedure between producers and the system 
operator. ST planning for maintenance decisions is 
necessary due to changes in operation conditions. In this 
paper, ST maintenance scheduling is studied in a smart 
distribution system and a single step procedure between 
the virtual power players (VPP) and the DSO is 
introduced. A VPP is a group of interconnected DG units, 
including renewable and non-renewable units and energy 
storage systems (ESS) located in different nodes of the 
distribution system, but managed as a single entity. In ST 
scheduling, the time horizon and increment differ from LT 
scheduling. In this model, the DSO provides the 
opportunity of resubmitting the maintenance outage plans 
for the following ST time horizon to those units that were 
previously considered for maintenance during this interval 
in LT plans.    
In comparison to LT maintenance scheduling, planning in 
the ST time horizon provides the VPPs with an efficient 
means to reach their outage decisions. They conservatively 
estimate the time periods that other VPPs choose for the 
maintenance outage, based on the information released 
after LT scheduling and the higher access to system 
conditions that they normally have in a smart grid. In this 
model, the decisions of VPPs are made simultaneously and 
each VPP can submit several plans to the DSO with 
different levels of priority and payments in case of 
deterioration in the reliability and security indices of the 
system.  
Game theory is applied to model maintenance scheduling 
in oligopolistic electricity markets, and the VPPs are 
considered as market players competing in a Cournot 
model. The Nash equilibrium of each VPP is obtained by 
maximizing its ST profit in a pool market. 
Operational decisions need the approval of the DSO, 
which is responsible for planning, operating, and 
managing the distribution system. Maintenance outages 
naturally deteriorate the grid reliability and increase the 
operation cost; therefore, the DSO should check the VPPs’ 
proposals from the viewpoint of security and reliability 
constraints and probably modify them. 
This work develops the coordination procedure proposed 
in [1] by introducing a model for maintenance outage 
scheduling in the level of producers. In [1] the reaction of 
the DSO to suggested maintenance outage plans of 
producers is modelled. A stochastic model for optimal 
risk-based outage scheduling based on hourly price-based 
unit commitment is suggested in [2]. The scenarios reflect 
the randomness in hourly prices of energy, ancillary 
services and fuel. In this model, maintenance scheduling 
of generation companies is not affected by the loads’ 
behaviour during the scheduling time interval. In [3], line 
maintenance is included as constraint for unit maintenance 
scheduling problem. However, the generating units do not 
consider the load forecasts or the generation patterns of 
rival units. Supply function equilibrium is used in [4] to 
represent the strategic behaviour of each electricity 
supplier.  
ST maintenance scheduling is studied in a 33-bus 
distribution test system, which has high penetration of 
DGs and ESSs, from the viewpoint of each individual VPP 
and considering the regulating authority of the DSO over 
proposed outage plans.  
SMART DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
The technologies that support bidirectional communication 
infrastructure in distribution systems enable them to 
experience effective coordination procedures between the 
participants and consequently function smarter [1].  
The main responsibility of the DSO in a smart grid is 
regional grid stability and load balancing. In the EU 
commission task force for smart grids, DSO is introduced 
as an independent entity in charge of distribution system 
operation, maintenance, development in the given area, 
and interconnection with other systems [5].  
Due to the time limitation, an iterative coordination 
procedure between the producers and the DSO appears 
impossible and consequently a single step procedure is 
used in the proposed ST maintenance outage scheduling. 
PROBLEM OF THE VPP 
The expected payoff of VPPi during the following time 
horizon is shown in (1). Each VPP seeks the maximum 
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payoff during the scheduling horizon of T periods. Two 
markedly different functions are considered to model the 
revenue function of an individual VPP at time period t and 
for scenario s. The index of each generating unit or ESS is 
j in (1), and 
i  is the set of generating units owned and 
managed by VPPi. The sign sP shows the probability of 
occurrence for each expected scenario. 
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The underlying distinction between the two revenue 
functions is the inclusion of rival’s decisions in the 
decision-making procedure of VPPi. In the first revenue 
function (2), the price of electricity   for each time 
period of the following ST time horizon is considered as a 
stochastic input data (2). The uncertainty in forecasted 
price scenarios is considered in the model by the assigned 
probability.  
Rev1 ( ) ( ) ( )s s sj jt t P t j    
(2) 
Inverse demand function is used in the second revenue 
function (3), to model the reaction of loads to the changes 
in price. Implementing the second revenue function 
depends on an uncertain estimation of other VPPs 
probable generation pattern during the following ST time 
interval. Various sources are used to build the proper 
assessment of an individual VPP of what others can 
produce during the following time horizon. The LT plans 
that are publicly announced by the DSO for all the 
participants in the market are implemented as a reliable 
means to help each VPP make an acceptable realization of 
what other competitors in the market might produce during 
the following ST time horizon. Maintenance outage 
decisions are the main elements in LT plans that are 
trusted by the target VPP in this form of the revenue 
functions. This interconnection between the decisions of 
the market players takes place in oligopolistic electricity 
markets, where few players compete with each other to 
maximize their profits. When the decision variables are the 
generation quantities, the Cournot model, a game theory-
based approach, is used to calculate the Nash equilibrium.  
Rev 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )s s s s sj jt a t b t D t P t j        (3) 
One of the main sources that cause uncertainty in future 
planning is the forecasted demand curve. It is not possible 
to consider the uncertainty of demand in the objective 
function that is based on the first revenue function, due to 
the reason that the target VPP needs an estimation of other 
units’ generation to be able to include the forecasted 
demand curve in the ST maintenance scheduling. 
In [2], the income derived from bilateral contracts, 
spinning and non-spinning reserves is also considered to 
show the income of each producer that owns several 
generating units and participate in the pool market. 
However, the scope of this paper is to study the inclusion 
of rivals’ strategies on decision-making procedure of an 
individual VPP and demonstrating the coordination 
procedure between LT plans and ST maintenance 
scheduling and between DSO and VPPs in ST outage 
scheduling.  
In LT scheduling it is possible to have several data 
exchange between the VPPs and the DSO to accomplish 
generation and maintenance plans. Nevertheless, due to 
the time limitations in ST scheduling it would be more 
efficient and applicable to define a single step 
coordination procedure between the VPPs and the DSO. 
It is necessary to add the reserve constraints when the 
second form of revenue function is used. 
The ST period might be a week or more. In the case study 
performed in this paper, time increments are considered as 
one hour in a weekly time interval.  
VPPs need to include several operational constraints in 
their decision-making. The reserve constraint that is 
required when the VPPs are considering the rivals’ 
generation strategies (3), ensures a prespecified amount of 
power as reserve in each time period. The rest of 
constraints ensure the continuity of maintenance periods of 
each generating unit, crew availability limitations by 
defining the maximum number of units that a VPP can 
handle for maintenance at each time period and the 
commitment logic. 
The source of uncertainty for the first revenue function is 
the uncertainty in forecasted price. In the second revenue 
function, the load demand, parameters of the inverse linear 
demand function that are affected by the price elasticity of 
demand at each period, and the VPP’s expectation of other 
rivals’ generation and maintenance plan during the 
following time interval are the main sources that impose 
uncertainty on the decision-making procedure of each 
individual VPP.  
The scenarios and their assigned probabilities are 
generated by the sequential Monte Carlo simulation. The 
VPPs need to reduce the number of scenarios either after 
optimization or before applying the proposed method, 
because the DSO only accepts limited number of 
proposals for the maintenance outage during the following 
horizon. However, the main purpose of scenario reduction 
techniques is helping the planners to achieve a reasonably 
good compromise between computation time and solution 
accuracy in stochastic optimization problems. In this 
paper, SCENRED, an efficient tool in GAMS that 
implements backward and fast forward reduction methods 
is used for scenario reduction [6]. 
PROBLEM OF THE DSO 
The objective of the generating units and the transmission 
lines, which is generally profit maximization, conflicts 
with the objective of the DSO for the generation and 
transmission scheduling.    
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Figure 1.  Interaction between VPP i, its rivals and the DSO 
Maximizing the social welfare is the principal objective of 
the governing authority in a distribution system. In the 
absence of demand side bidding this objective can be 
equally explained as the consumer payment minimization 
[4]. This is also true in a smart grid where a DSO is the 
regulatory authority in charge of maintaining the security 
and reliability of the system at an acceptable level [3]. 
In the proposed model, the VPPs submit their suggested 
plans for maintenance to the DSO (figure 1). The DSO is 
responsible for planning, operating and managing the 
distribution system and operates a monopoly business for 
its regional network [1]. 
The social welfare is theoretically the area between the 
aggregate bid curve and the aggregate offer curve [7]. If 
the demand is inelastic, maximizing the above function 
will be equivalent to minimizing the production cost. 
In the DSO’s objective function (1) the index p shows the 
priority of the maintenance scheduling plans for generating 
unit j and line y. The two binary decision variables α and β 
are 1 if the suggested plan for that unit or line is accepted. 
The payments that act as penalty in the case that the 
preferred plans deteriorate the reliability and security 
constraints of the system is shown by Φ and Ψ in the 
objective function. The function OC represents the system 
aggregate operation cost for all the scheduling horizon. 
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CASE STUDY 
Figure 2 shows the one-line diagram of a 25-kV 33-bus 
distribution test system with weekly peak load of 8060 kW 
and installed capacity of 9855 kW comprised of 32 
distributed generating units which are managed by 4 
VPPs. The VPPs submit their preferred maintenance 
outage plans for the following 168 hours of a weekly time 
horizon. The DSO checks the proposed plans, considering 
the payments that VPPs have proposed to the DSO to 
increase the chance of acceptance for their preferred plans. 
A stochastic mixed-integer linear problem is solved by 
each VPP, considering both proposed revenue functions. 
The DSO needs to run a mixed-integer nonlinear problem. 
The reason for non-linearity in the problem of the DSO is 
the inclusion of reliability and security constraints.  
Maintenance scheduling from the viewpoint of an 
individual VPP is carried out based on the two 
aforementioned revenue functions for each generating unit. 
In the first proposed function, stochastic electricity prices 
with their assigned probabilities for all the periods are 
required. In the second revenue function, the VPPs need 
the parameters of the inverse linear demand function to 
model the relationship between the electricity price and 
the consumers’ willing to purchase at that price. After 
reducing the 22 initial scenarios generated  by considering 
the uncertainties in demand function and the estimated 
generation pattern of other VPPs to two scenarios with the 
SCENRED tool in GAMS; the probabilities of occurrence 
for the price elasticity of 0.4 and 0.5 at price 85 €/MWh 
are respectively calculated as 0.3 and 0.7. The maximum 
number of maintenance plans that the DSO accepts for the 
following weekly ST period is two distinct proposals. The 
priority outage plans of VPPs for each unit might have 
overlap for some periods; however, the penalties are just 
paid in the case that the target unit is considered for 
maintenance by the DSO just during the specified 
suggested periods [1]. 
In figure 3 the available generation capacity is shown, 
considering the LT maintenance plans and the offline units 
for maintenance. In the LT maintenance plan, 13 
generating units were considered for maintenance outage 
during the following week.  
Table I shows the maintenance periods that VPPs will 
suggest to the DSO categorized by their priority and 
preference. It is obvious that it would be more desirable 
for VPPs to gain approval over their suggested plans with 
higher priority.  
 
 
Figure 2.  33 bus test system 
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Figure 3.  Available capacity in LT maintenance plan 
In figure 4 the reliability index, which is calculated by 
dividing the net reserve by the gross reserve at each time 
period, is shown for the 168 hours of the following week. 
First priority of all VPPs is considered for analysis. When 
the VPPs determine their maintenance outage periods 
without considering the probable strategies of the rival 
VPPs, the reliability index deteriorates in several periods 
and the DSO will certainly reject the first priority plans of 
some VPPs.  
Table I – Maintenenace plans submitted to the DSO 
 
 
Figure 4.  Reliability index for the 168 hours 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the proposed model, the impact of LT maintenance 
plans on ST decision-making of generating units is 
studied. The merit of this work is featured by considering 
the strategic interaction between the VPPs and including 
the uncertainty of estimations. Although the generating 
units are not obligated to meet the demand of customers, 
including the most probable generation pattern of rival 
generating units in addition to the demand behaviour in the 
following ST time interval gives more realistic assessment 
of the system. The results show that including the 
estimation of the rivals’ generation pattern and trying to 
satisfy the reserve constraints, VPPs can increase the 
chance of acceptance for their preferred outage plans.  
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